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NARRATIVE 
Pol Vandevelde 
The study of narratives is at the crossroads of several disciplines with significant 
overlaps. Literary theory and semiotics have analyzed narratives in their structures, 
roles, types, and ideological functions. Authors like Ro land Barthes, Gerard Genette 
and Tzvetan Todorov on the French s ide and Vladimir Propp and Mikhail Bakhtine 
on the Russian side have provided a sophisticated framework within which narratives 
came to be recognized in their specific identity. The reflection on history has gene r-
ated an abundan t lite rature on the status of historical narratives with people like 
Hayden White and Lo uis Mink. Some trends in ethics h ave emphasized the cen-
trality of narratives either as a vehicle for ethical standards or as the very articulation 
of such standards. A brand of virtue e thics, for example, led by Alasdair Macintyre, 
has recognized the role of narratives for manifesting and preserving ethical virtues. 
Besides the overlap of disciplines dea ling with narratives, what complicates the 
approach to narratives is their close connection to the two o ther fundamental 
notio ns of discourse and text. Jacques D errida's focus o n text as an o riginal inscription 
of any act of the mind and Michel Foucault's analysis of discourse as the framewo rk 
within which subjects are able to articulate any claim have contributed to bring the 
notion of narrative into philosophical discussion, but with a certain ideological col-
oration with regard to the status of the subject and the no tion of truth . Like text and 
discourse, a narrative is a fo rm o f mediation. What has largely m otivated the philo-
sophical discussion abo ut narratives is precisely the q uestio n of whether thinking 
needs o r does not need a mediation. 
The framing of the debate about narratives is largely due to Aristotle who in his 
Poetics recognized the role of narratives o r muthoi, but only for lite rature and h istory, 
which are both viewed as inferior to philosophy, although lite rature - tragedy fo r 
Aristotle - is more philosophical than histo ry. It is only when the whole framework 
of mimesis was questioned, fo r example, by German Romantic ism , and when truth 
was no longer simply a matter of the mind directly grasping the sense of what is 
external to it that the relevance of narratives came to be recognized to the extent that 
narratives offer an articulation of what can become a candidate for truth. T his 
reformulation of truth as something that is not simply opposed to fiction or free 
from a linguistic articulation took place at the same time that literature ga ined its 
present status as an aesthetic production and histo ry became a well-established 
discipline. I will focus on the ro le of narratives in philosophy and more specifica lly 
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in phenomenology, which has been one of the movements that has most forcefully 
reframed our understanding of truth. I start by listing some relevant features of what 
a narrative is and then examine how some phenomenologists have dealt with or used 
narratives. 
Narratives in a historical context 
Since early times the basic unit of thinking has been judgment and its content or 
expression, the proposition. This basic unit was compatible with a strong realist 
position of Aristotelian provenance as well as with a theistic view of medieval character 
or a modern account of Cartesian or Kantian inspiration. In all of these models, the 
judgment and its accompanying proposition was the ideal tool to formulate reality's 
essence (in the Aristotelian framework), God's plan in nature (in the theistic model) 
or the subject's representation of reality (in the Cartesian or Kantian framework). 
What is common to these different models is the unitary character of the source of 
knowledge, be it the world, God, or the subject, respectively. Once this unitary 
character was no longer seen as satisfactory or plausible, judgment lost its privilege 
as the unifying device that could provide a warranted or true knowledge. There are 
many reasons for such an explosion of the unitary character of the source of 
knowledge. Among them is the fact that the plurality or diversity of views on nature 
and the world in general both manifested the weakness of the prevalent models and 
the attractiveness of alternative models. Another reason is that reality or the world 
appeared far more complex than what a single subject could comprehend. A further 
reason is the claim by subjects, who became aware of their plurality and diversity, 
that their specific perspectives could not be subsumed under some general or 
universal types. 
Parallel to the many reasons behind the recognition of their central role, narratives 
also have many different features that explain their attractiveness. Three of these 
features seem paramount: (a) narratives are perspectivistj (b) they include an element 
of fictionj and (c) they are open-ended and completable. 
The very notion of narrative when used in matters of knowledge or accounts of 
reality entails a specifically subjective character in the sense that a narrative is both 
something that has to be performed by a human being and has an intrinsically 
conversational character. As a performance it is an utterance that is social in nature 
and which engages both the responsibility of the utterer and asks for the participation 
of a listener to whom the narrative is addressed. Due to its conversational character 
a narrative is not a definitely closed semantic unit, as a judgment can be, although it 
has a beginning and an end. It usually does not claim to provide some final account 
of what is the case, as judgments are usually understood to do. What narratives 
provide, instead, is an articulation of what is the case or what took place, whether it 
is an action, an event, or even a period of time, and they invite readers or listeners to 
link this articulation not on the basis of its truth in terms of an adequacy with what 
is the case, but on the basis of the relevance, fruitfulness, or future potential of such 
an articulation. Narratives, thus, have in themselves a conversational component and 
a malleability that judgments do not have and do not need. 
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What may explain the persp ec t ivist character of narratives is their relationship to 
the future. Because they are n o t directly accountab le to what is the case, narratives 
also have the potential to con figure and to shape actions and events by linking 
them to the future. Histo ry is continuo usly rewritten by serious histo r ians neither 
because their predecessors were careless and oblivio us no r because they want to 
promulgate their agenda o n past act ions and events, but because they speak from the 
pe rspective of a different future, in the sense that it is the anticipa tio n o f a certain 
future we envisage that leads us to revisit and thus reinterpret the past . It is the 
future we anticipate fo r o urselves that seems to mo tivate our interest in a history of 
the U nited States from the perspec tive of the people (Zinn 2003) o r the tell ing of 
what native A mericans suffe red. H ayden W hite and Paul Ricoeur, among others, 
have led a sustained reflectio n o n this perspectivist and configurative power of 
narratives. Analogously, the ava ilab ility o f narrat ives in literature, fo r example, can 
also shape o r reshape our common ways of looking at th ings and understand ing 
ourselves. R icoeur has here again been a pioneer in th is re flection (1 984, 2004). 
Som eone like Martha Nussbaum has also sh own how reading literature o r narratives 
can enrich legal procedures by allowing judge and jury to see defendants otherwise 
than solely thro ugh legal mo lds (1995). In this regard the reading of novels can 
info rm pub lic reasoning and give new tractio n to rationality. 
Bes ides their perspectivist ch aracter , narratives also include an element of fiction. 
The re is in a narrative a sto rytell ing component that canno t be neatl y encapsulated 
in the fact that " it is abo ut " something, as the cano n ic definitio n of judgment 
spec ifies : to state someth ing of something. T he fundamental opacity of the "of" o r 
"about" something had to be acknowledged o nce it became accepted that the unitary 
character o f knowledge could n o longe r be expected either fro m the subject or from 
reality itself, wh ich only "speaks" thro ugh the proxies human subjects believe they 
are. Thus, the preposit ion "of" or "about" was no longer a mere syntactical marker, 
but revealed an onto logical character of reality: as Soko lowski says in another, 
Husserlian, context , reality is " infused with syntax" (Soko lowski 2000: 88). And it is 
this onto logica l syntax that asks fo r a sto rytelling. N ow, sto rytelling o r fiction is not 
to be understood in the modern or pre-modern sense as if fic tio n could be assessed 
in its fictitious make-up by co mparing it with a naked o r immediately accessib le 
reality. Since it is this very reality that is syntactic, providing the syntactic art iculation 
of an actio n o r an event is indeed inventing something. It is an articulation in words 
and sentences of something that did no t exist in the action o r the event themselves, 
since these are not made of wo rds. H o wever, th is invention is no t a fa brication of 
something that had no effective materialization before. And it is not a mere discovery 
o f what that action or event was, since actio ns and events reveal them selves - almost 
pho tograph ically - th rough the narratives that are given o f them . 
Still , even if we grant that narratives reveal the relevance o r fruitfulness of actions 
and events, do narratives evacuate the possibility of judging that som e accounts are 
true and o thers are fa lse? It m ay be that n arratives render judgments more careful 
and mo re complicated , but ultimately it is still judgments that d etermine whether a 
histo rian is a revisionist o r a serio us one and whether an eye witness is just a 
good sto ryteller o r a truth-te ller. In o rder to determine the validity o f narratives one 
could appeal to the d istinction E. D . Hirsch makes between ve rbal meaning and 
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significance in the case of texts (Hirsch 1967: 31). Applying these notions to actions 
and events, we could say that the significance of an action or an event is what 
they mean to us, whereas the meaning is included in the action and event itself, not 
relative to us. 
Unfortunately, while the distinction works neatly in small units of discourse, like 
a sentence o r a small text, which are also directly availab le to other observers, 
the distinction loses much of its sharpness and attractiveness when we are dealing 
with a larger narrative, like a h istorical account, and when our access to the object of 
the narrative is made through a long chain of mediations, as in the case of the distant 
past. For example, when we are dealing with the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides 
offers us a powerful and coherent account, so powerful, however, that it is not clear 
how we could distinguish the meaning from the significance of the Peloponnesian 
War. The meaning of an action or an event may be simply the significance this 
action o r event has for us when we are blind to our own background and framework 
of reference. In other words, it may be only in a diachronic perspective, when we 
are removed from a particular background or framework of reference that we can 
make the distinction between the meaning a particular event had at the time it took 
place and the significance it has for us. For example, we can see the meaning of 
Andrew Jackson's eviction of the Cherokees that forced them to move on a "trail of 
tears" to Oklahoma, a decision that was largely accepted and praised at the time, and 
the significance such a decision has for us now, when Jackson's action is largely 
blamed and condemned. 
If the distinction between meaning (which is supposed to be intrinsic) and significance 
(which is supposed to be extrinsic) is a retrospective q ualification in a diachronic 
perspective, and thus, as such, a category of interpretation, th is distinction cannot by 
itself determine the truth of a narrative. What it can do is to validate a narrative 
through an interpretive process. As a consequence, when dealing with the truth of 
narratives, we have to accept an element of fiction, in the sense that truth is configured 
and is a matter of invention instead of mere discovery. While this may vindicate one 
of Martin Heidegger's main philosophical contributions that truth is disclosure, this 
element of fiction has also prevented a theory of narrative from establishing itself as 
a full-fledged candidate for a new theory of truth. And this may be due to the third 
feature of narrative (besides perspectivism and fiction): narratives are open-ended. 
While narratives in o rder to be narratives clearly need to have a beginning and an 
end, the end is only of the perspective taken. Since narratives present themselves as 
perspectivist , there is inscribed in their core a radical openness that makes them 
amenable to being continued. This continuation can take different forms . We can 
revisit narratives, as we do with history, biography, or when we reinterpret the canon. 
We can amend narratives by adding new perspectives to what Lincoln realized or 
what Nelson Mandela achieved. And we can reject past colonialist narratives that do 
not fit with our values. 
This fact that narratives are not definitive, although they make a claim to the 
truth , that they are finished, but not definitively complete, in short that they are 
completable, may be the most strik ing aspect of our current situation in the twenty-first 
century at a time when we have fully acknowledged the mediation of narratives. The 
explosion of types of narratives, whether of personal, sexual, gender, or ethnic 
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identity, whether of religious, social, or political allegiance, has certainly multiplied 
the m an y voices people can find and borrow. But these types of narratives seem to 
have been antithetical to any common good o r any commo n set of values that was 
supposed to be the basis for plurality and diversity. The different features of a narrative 
mentio ned above - perspectivism, fiction, incompleteness - were gained against a 
unitary source of knowledge that they were supposed to replace , but the unity was 
expec ted to remain in the thread, as it were, of plurality and diversity. Narratives 
were supposed to be a source of knowledge. Now we are at a point where the p lur-
ality and diversity of narratives have relativized the very n ot io n of knowledge and 
with this relativizatio n room has been made for power to take over discourse. Such 
a s ituation is remarkable , if not paradoxical, and Lyotard tr ied to address it in his 
own way (1984). On the one hand, in m ost social discourses praise is showered on 
plurality and diversity of narratives, but, on the other, there is one single discou rse at 
the econo mic level: global capital, which has become the reference document for most 
economists or politic ians and which functions as the vernacu lar of ordinary people. 
Despite the plurality of narratives motivated by a des ire to unmask any meta-narrative, 
this economic d iscourse functions unimpeded as a meta-narrative and at the same 
time feeds a multiplicity o f narratives while escaping the ir bite and scrutin y. This 
remarkable situation may po int to a limit of a decentered and disseminated narrative 
knowledge when it comes to issues of social and economic justice. 
Narratives in phenomenology 
Phenomenology has been one of the m ost powerful philosophical movements to try 
to reformulate the notio n of truth by examining its many med iations. The most 
impo rtant of these narrative mediations has been literature. Almost all phenomeno-
logists from Roman Inga rden to Jean-Paul Sartre, from Heidegger to Ricoeur have 
seen in literature an invention of meaning. Among those who have explicitly refl ected 
upo n narratives in the narrow sense, French thinkers distinguished them selves. with 
Ricoeur and Lyotard as the main representative figures. While both Ricoeur and 
L yota rd have offered an explicit theory of narratives, th in kers like Fo ucault and 
D errida have explo red o ther aspects of the view that knowledge is narrative in 
nature . 
Bo th Ricoeur and Lyotard appeal to the Greeks and especially Aristotle. It is all 
the more noteworthy that their focus is rather opposite. Ricoeur, following Aristotle , 
exploits the potential of emplo tment: a narrative makes explicit through words, 
sentences, metaphors, etc., the implicit syntax that already lies at the heart of actions 
and events. Narratives fundamentally unify . By contrast, Lyotard brings attent ion to 
the stifling effect of narratives when they become a meta-narrative in the sense of an 
all-encompassing synthesis. Let us examine briefly these two o pposite uses of narratives. 
Ricoeur 
Ricoeur cu ltivates the ambiguity of narratives: they allo w us to understand time, 
actions, oneself, and history, as well as what constitutes the make-up of those 
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"entities," altho ugh time is clearly not narrative just as action is no t m ade of words. 
This cultivated ambiguity is also in the canonic Husserlian refo rmulation of 
consciousness as co nsc iousness " o f" something, the prepos ition linking o bject and 
consciousness in their ontological status, but in a way that does no t " de-realize" 
objects as me re mental entities and does not valo rize consc io usness as what 
prescribes its o rder to the wo rld in a Kantian fash ion . Still, Ricoeur nicely illustrates 
the different features that were listed above, since the actio n as it is in its articulation 
cannot be separated fro m the understanding of this action. Narratives thus serve 
both as mediato r - what allows us to understand act ions and histo ry - and as the 
meaning content o f actions and events - it is only when recounted that we know 
what an action o r event means. N arratives combine - o r confuse - the o ntological 
and epistemo logica l levels . At the o nto logica l leve l an act ion or event is narrative-
made in the sense that an act ion h as a pre-narrative q uality and is what R icoeur ca lls 
a "potential narrative" ; at the epistemological level o ur understanding of actions and 
events is narrat ive-l ike in the sense that it is only in telling a story of what h ap pened that 
we can come to know what happened . As Ricoeur says, the past does n o t give itself, 
because it is no t o bservable, but h as to be reconstructed o n the bas is of testimonies. 
These two as pects of "narrative-made" and "narrative-l ike" are quite a p rovocative 
device in o rde r to approach an d render the past . In the case of time, Ricoeur 
attempts to show how time is understood , no t what t ime is; in the case of selfhood, 
there is a priv ilege o f the first-pe rson perspective so that the self to a large extent 
depends on how the self understa nds itself. Thus, the claim that the self is made of 
narratives is a weak onto logical cla im since it is rather the self-u nd erstanding that is 
narrative-made. It is not so with actions and past events which are thoroughly sub-
mitted to intersubjective scrutiny and cannot be invented by an ind iv idual irrespect ive 
of what the pu blic record is . T hus, to claim that ac tions and past events are narra-
tive-made is a rather strong cla im and will be a good test not only fo r Ricoeur 's 
theory of narratives, but also fo r the onto logical plau sib ility of narratives. 
The com mon view that a narrat ive about actio n and past events recounts them 
such as they were manifes ts the ch allenge of a theor y of narratives. Fo r , this appar-
ently s imple claim involves what R icoeur calls the three genres of sameness, d ifference, 
and analogy. The genre of sam en ess is involved to the extent that historians, for 
example, are con sidered h isto rian s p recisely becau se they claim that what they 
recount in their n arrative is "the same" as what took place; this is indicated by the 
word "such ." But the genre of " diffe rence" is also in volved since there is a difference 
in nature between a narrative mad e o f words and sentences, on the o n e h and , and an 
action or event m ade of physical m ovements and gestures performed by people of 
flesh and blood , o n the other. Fin a lly, the word "as" in the expressio n "such as they 
were" points to the genre o f "analogy." The past h as to be recovered and recon-
structed and thus requires a mediation that the nar rat ive offers: the narrative exerts 
the function of representing (representance) or stand ing-in (lielltenance) which offers an 
equiva lent of what took place (Ricoeur 1988: Vol. 3, 143). 
Ricoeur believes that this express io n of "such as they were" illustrates a dia l~c tic 
between what he ca lls the three levels of mimesis. The sameness claimed by the 
narrative toward what is narrated assumes that ac tio n s and events them selves are of 
a narrative structure. This is what Ricoeur calls " M imes is )" as the pre-narrative level 
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of action and events. " Mimesisz" is the actual level of te lling a narrative of what took 
place, providing an explicit articulation of what was implicit in action and events by 
giving an analogon or a representing of it. The additional level of "Mimesis}" 
represents the impact the level of "Mimesisz" has on how we can act and behave 
(Ricoeur 1984- 88: Vol. 1, 72). Narratives re-signify the world of action in the sense 
that we borrow narratives in order to act, behave , or understand . Literature is, in 
this regard , what Ricoeur calls a labo ratory for moral judgments. This intermingling 
of narrative levels is a reformulation of the hermeneutic circle of Heideggerean and 
Gadamerian provenance: actions and experiences already have a pre-narrative quality 
so that rendering them in a narrative is neither redundant - merely repeating the 
same structure - no r violent - imposing a different structural o rder; rather, it brings 
them intelligibility and does them justice . 
Ho weve r, this latte r · point has left Ricoeur unsatisfied. We need some form of 
d evice to make sure that what is qualified as "pre-narrative" is intrinsically such, in 
itself, as it were, and not a retrospective qualification made from the perspective of 
the narrative that has been offered of it. In other words, we need some guarantee 
that the stories to ld about actio ns and events are not mere sto ries or "as if" stories that 
mere ly help us understand actio ns and events, but that these sto ries are " true" stor-
ies, b ringing to light the "meaning" that those actions and events have in themselves. In 
Time and Nanative Ricoeur tho ught that the notion of a debt could guarantee the fai r-
ness o r the correctness of the narrative enterprise. Because historians are grabbed by 
a past that speaks to them, they feel a debt toward what took place or toward the 
suffering o f victims, for example; this attitude creates an obligatio n for historians to 
do justice to the past. Although it is richer than a mere dialec tica l movement 
between levels o f narratives in the threefold mimesis, Ricoeur acknowledges that th is 
no tion of debt may not be eno ugh to guard the pre-narrative level from being a mere 
retrospective qualification made by those who tell the story (2004: 279). 
Ricoeur revis its his views in M emoT)', History, Forgetting, o rigina lly published in 
2000, and appeals to the notion of attestation. Attestation is mo re than a mere exis-
tential attitude of being-in-debt, because it also includes the possibility o f just ification. 
What attestation does is to introduce in the narrative the parameter of the one who 
manifests herself as the author respons ible for the narrative. This means that the 
histo rian , for example , presents her self as the author of the narrative and, by implicitly 
saying "Here I am," opens herse lf to being questioned and critic ized, but also moves 
the discuss ion further by also asking for further evidence or counter-evidence fo r 
the claims made (2004: 181). 
This notion of attestation has two advantages. It acknowledges as uncircumventable 
the fact that the past cannot be merely retrieved such as it was. Because the past is 
" no more," it can o nly be attested to in its character of " having been " or "having 
passed, " thus in the traces it has left of its passage. The "suchness" o f the narrative -
the "such" in the expression "such as it was" - neithe r replaces no r represents the 
"actually happened, " but allows it to reach its public presence and thus to be 
accessible . Ricoeur considers that this " representing" (representance) adduces an 
" increase of being" or an " increase of sense" or an " increase of meaning." T he 
second advantage of attestation is that it links the claim to recover the past such as it 
was to the moral standing of the person who tells the narrative. Although it is 
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through the significance the past has to the author of the narrative that the meaning 
of what happened is articulated in the narrative, attestation makes the author of the 
narrative in principle accountable to what happened. While there is no empirical 
possibility to move back from the narrative as articulated meaning to the sense at the 
level of the experiences the narrative recounts, in principle attestation guarantees 
that such an exchange back from narrative to past events is virtually possible to the 
extent that the author of the narrative, if presented with conflicting evidence, will 
have to justify what she wrote, modify it, or retract it. Attestation makes the author 
of a narrative accountable and thus inscribes at the heart of narratives a process of 
justification. Narratives are stories and performance, and as performance they are 
social and moral acts in the public sphere. 
Lyotard 
Lyotard uses narratives in two different and somewhat opposite ways. In the Posrmodern 
Condition Lyotard drew attention to the fact that in our post-industrial societies we 
cannot appeal to a meta-narrative that would unify all our discursive practices. This 
has led to a dissemination of knowledge and its transformation into power. While 
assenting to the view that all knowledge is narrative in nature Lyotard criticizes 
the sciences in general for denying their narrative character. He attempts to unmask the 
hidden narratives of justification and legitimacy that provide sciences with their 
status and these hidden narratives are ones that appeal to the mastery of nature and 
the increase of power. By unveiling these hidden narratives at the heart of a knowledge 
that claims to be free of narratives , Lyotard also wants to show that our post-industrial 
societies are deprived of any all-encompassing narrative, what he calls a meta-narrative, 
that would bring into a unity all the multiple narratives of morality, politics, or 
knowledge. People do not have faith anymore in the ideal of progress or emancipa-
tion or justice for all. As Lyotard claims, reason also gave rise to Auschwitz. This 
rupture between our post-industrial societies and the tradition that preceded and 
nurtured them is the starting point of what he calls a postmodern era. 
In his ambitious work, The Differend, Lyotard offers a more systematic view of the 
link between narratives and discourse. He breaks down the entity of a narrative into 
what he calls "phrases" and emphasizes the performance aspect of "phrasing" 
something as well as the importance of the link between phrases, which include units 
of discourse as well as gestures (1988: xii). The different types of discourses - moral, 
political, economic - determine the modes of linking a phrase onto another. As 
speakers we are submitted to these discourses and modes of linking phrases in order 
to be recognized as reasonable speakers and professionals. Even stronger, we only 
become subjects when we have learned how to link to a series of phrases that precede 
our own occurrence. One of the most original notions Lyotard brings to the fore is 
what he calls a "differend" (1988: 3- 5). Given the precedence of discourses and types 
of phrases, there are some facts or events that may not be susceptible to be articu-
lated in the idioms or phrases that are current in a community or society and thus 
cannot reach the level of a narrative in which this unformulated deed, act, or event 
could be publicly discussed or litigated. Lyotard calls such an unformulated poten-
tiallitigation a "wrong." What may hint at such a wrong are silence, anger, pain or a 
feeling of powerlessness. Because such a wrong cannot be identified, even by those 
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who suffer it ,' it is a "differend ." However, there is also a productive aspect of such 
differends , for they ask for a change in the way we link onto existing phrases. They 
ask for new modes of articulating what heretofo re could no t be spoken of. 
Derrida and Foucault 
A discussion of narratives within phenomeno logy cannot ignore the important refor-
mulatio n of this notion by Derrida and Foucault, each in his o \\'n incomparable way. 
Derrida does not speak of narratives, but rather of texts, especially in his earlier 
period, claiming that " there is nothing outside of the text " (2004: 158). By taking 
issue with the self- identity that thinking and, by association, the subject claim to 
have, Derrida engaged in a rather productive enterpr ise of "deconstructing" o r 
showing the "disseminatio n " at work in severa l canonic works of the Western 
traditio n. By appealing to a process of inscription that precedes and makes possible 
the intentio nal acts of subjects, Den"ida atte mpts to show that the very conceptual 
oppositio ns that we need in o rder to think, like internal versus external, proper 
versus metaphorica l, o riginal versus interpretation, are effects, rather than foundations. 
As a consequence, the interpretation of a text, for example, cannot claim to take the 
o riginal as an object, but can o nly graft o nto the origina l, continuing it and this 
means: writing another text. The net result is that any claim to truth, validity, o r 
accuracy is relativized to the process of linking to a text within the gene ral text o f a 
particular histo rica l period, with particular goals, a particular location in a culture 
with its own ideology, etc. 
In the case of Foucault, one of his main interests has been the internal organization 
of a discourse and the types of discourses . From Birch of the Clinic to Madness and 
Civilization and from The Order of Things (Foucault 1971) to Discipline a nd Punish he 
has ana lyzed theoretically as well as empiricaIly the status of what he calls a "statement," 
and the different modalities such a statement can take within different discourses. 
Discourses, whether clinical, econo mic or sc ientific, a re essen tially practices and 
Fo ucault speaks of discursive practices. An object only exists within a network o f 
relatio ns among institutions, econo mic processes; types of classification, modes o f 
ch aracterization, etc. Although there is an evolution in Foucault's views, his funda-
mental goal has remained constant: to bring to the fore the rules accord ing to which 
discourses are formed. ince these discourses are the space as well as the framework 
within which anything, things as we ll as subjects, has to be articulated in o rder to 
reach a level of social recognitio n and intelligibility, unveiling the rules of discursive 
practices amounts to showing both the roots of o nto logy as well as the variations 
and transformatio ns of ontologies in the course of time. 
See also Jacques Derrida (Chapter 10); History (Chapter 21); Hermeneut ics 
(Chapter 45); Deconstruction (C hapter 46); Post-structuralism: Michel Fo ucault 
(Chapter 48); The social sciences (Chapter 57); Literar y criticism (Chapter 58). 
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